Black Swan Observatory

Ledger

Pre-event theses are kept verbatim; misses are recorded, not rewritten. Methods →

KPIs exclude illustrative examples; the lists below include them, tagged.

Hit rate
N/A 0 of 0 decided
Completed reviews
0
Validated
0
Misses
0 0 invalidated · 0 stopped

Recorded misses 1

Audit feed 3

newest first
Validated Illustrative Author: example-macro • Audited: 2024-04-30
View Original Frozen Memo Dossier
Bank of Japan Exit From Negative Rates
Pre-Event Core Hypothesis

The Bank of Japan will end negative interest rates by 30 April 2024 without a disorderly sell-off in Japanese government bonds.

Portfolio Assumption

Hold a small position for higher Japanese yields; no leverage, given the risk of a disorderly move.

Established Falsification Criteria (3 Triggers)
  • The Bank of Japan policy rate is still negative after its April 2024 meeting.
  • The Bank of Japan announces a bond purchase operation outside its published monthly purchase plan, including any fixed-rate purchase operation, between 6 March and 30 April 2024 inclusive.
  • The 10-year yield in the Ministry of Finance daily series rises by 0.15 percentage points or more from one trading day's close to the next, between 6 March and 30 April 2024 inclusive.
POST-MORTEM & STRUCTURAL LESSON:

Validated. On 19 March 2024 the Bank of Japan raised its policy rate out of negative territory and ended yield curve control. No purchase operation outside the published plan was announced. The largest daily change in the 10-year yield over the window was 0.05 percentage points. The memo said nothing about the yen, which weakened after the decision instead of strengthening. A currency-based reading of the exit would have been wrong.

Invalidated Illustrative Author: example-credit • Audited: 2023-06-30
View Original Frozen Memo Dossier
US Uninsured Deposit Runs After Silicon Valley Bank
Pre-Event Core Hypothesis

Runs on uninsured deposits will spread beyond banks like Silicon Valley Bank into a system-wide panic, forcing an explicit guarantee of all uninsured US deposits by 30 June 2023.

Portfolio Assumption

Underweight US banks with high uninsured deposit shares and large unrealised securities losses; hold short-dated Treasuries.

Established Falsification Criteria (2 Triggers)
  • No explicit guarantee of all uninsured US deposits is announced by 30 June 2023.
  • Two or fewer further banks appear on the FDIC failed-bank list with closing dates from 13 March to 30 June 2023 inclusive, not counting SVB and Signature.
POST-MORTEM & STRUCTURAL LESSON:

Invalidated on both criteria. No blanket guarantee was announced, and only one further US bank failed by 30 June: First Republic, closed and sold to JPMorgan Chase on 1 May 2023. It had the same profile as SVB. The memo likely underrated the new Fed facility. Lending against securities at par meant banks did not have to sell them at a loss, which plausibly blunted the fire-sale channel a broad panic would need. The outcome is consistent with this explanation but does not prove it.

Validated Illustrative Author: example-rates • Audited: 2022-10-14
View Original Frozen Memo Dossier
UK Gilt Sell-Off and the LDI Collateral Spiral
Pre-Event Core Hypothesis

Collateral calls on leveraged liability-driven investment (LDI) funds will force sales of long-dated gilts, turning the post-fiscal-event sell-off into a self-reinforcing spiral that needs an official backstop within three weeks.

Portfolio Assumption

Cut long-dated sterling duration exposure and add no new long gilt risk until an official backstop is announced.

Established Falsification Criteria (2 Triggers)
  • The 30-year gilt yield gives back the rise since 22 September 2022 within ten trading days without any Bank of England market operation.
  • No Bank of England or Financial Policy Committee statement cites gilt market dysfunction or LDI funds before 14 October 2022.
POST-MORTEM & STRUCTURAL LESSON:

Validated. On 28 September 2022 the Bank of England began temporary purchases of long-dated gilts on financial stability grounds, and the operation ended on 14 October. The memo got the mechanism right but treated it as purely mechanical. It did not weigh how fast fiscal policy itself could change, which was the contrary archetype's channel.