Illustrative example. This memo was written in October 2026, after the outcome was known, to show how a desk memo works. Its pre-event sections use only information public on 26 September 2022. It is not part of the desk’s track record and is excluded from the hit rate.
Hypothesis
The UK government’s fiscal statement of 23 September 2022 announced large unfunded tax cuts. Gilt yields rose sharply, and sterling fell to a record low against the dollar on 26 September.
Many UK defined-benefit pension schemes hedge with leveraged LDI funds. Rising yields trigger collateral calls on those funds, and the fastest way to meet them is to sell long gilts. Those sales push yields higher and trigger more calls. Under the LIQUIDITY_SPIRAL archetype, this loop ends only when an official buyer steps in.
Contrary reading
Under POLICY_CREDIBILITY_CRISIS, the sell-off is a repricing of UK fiscal risk, not a forced-selling loop. If so, yields settle at a higher level without official intervention.
Base rate
Greenwood, Hanson, Shleifer and Sørensen (2022) find a 3-year crisis probability of about 7% in normal times. The 25% conditional figure is this desk’s own judgment for a market-functioning breakdown in this setup. It is not a result from the study.
Falsification criteria
- The 30-year gilt yield gives back its post-statement rise within ten trading days with no Bank of England operation.
- No Bank of England statement cites gilt market dysfunction or LDI funds before 14 October 2022.
Post-mortem (14 October 2022)
- Outcome: validated.
- What happened: the Bank of England announced temporary purchases of long-dated gilts on 28 September 2022, citing risks to UK financial stability. The purchases ended on 14 October.
- What the memo missed: it framed the risk as purely mechanical. It gave no weight to how quickly the fiscal policy behind the sell-off could be reversed.