The margin spiral is the leverage cycle compressed into hours. Leveraged positions are secured by collateral marked to market; when prices fall, the lender calls for more. A holder without spare cash must sell into the falling market to raise it, and those sales move the price that triggers the next call. Each participant is acting prudently under its own agreements; the sum of the prudence is a crash.
Black Monday 1987 is the structural archetype: portfolio insurance programs were contractually committed to sell as prices fell, and the market discovered that a large fraction of its participants had pre-agreed to be forced sellers at the same moment. The 22 percent single-day drop was less a change of opinion than a queue of mechanical orders finding no one on the other side.
LTCM in 1998 ran the spiral through a single overexposed balance sheet, but the 2022 UK gilt crisis is the purest recent specimen: pension funds using leveraged LDI strategies faced collateral calls as gilt yields rose, sold gilts to meet them, and drove yields higher — a doom loop in the world’s oldest bond market, halted only when the Bank of England stepped in as buyer.
The spiral’s signature is speed and indifference to fundamentals. Nothing about the long-run value of equities in 1987 or gilts in 2022 changed as fast as the prices did. What failed was the assumption, embedded in every margin agreement separately, that one’s own selling would not move the market — true for each, false for all.