Black Swan Observatory

Currency Peg Collapse

Mechanics · also: peg break, devaluation crisis

A fixed exchange rate holds until defending it costs more than markets believe the authorities will pay — then breaks all at once.

A currency peg is a promise with a visible price of defence. Holding the rate against selling pressure costs foreign reserves or punishing interest rates; the moment markets judge that cost politically unpayable, selling the currency becomes a nearly one-way bet. Speculators risk little — if the peg holds they lose transaction costs; if it breaks they collect the devaluation.

The 1992 ERM crisis made the asymmetry famous. Britain, in recession, could not credibly hold rates high enough to defend sterling’s Deutschmark band, and the market — Soros most visibly — forced the exit in a single day. The lesson was about credibility, not reserves: the peg died when the defence became incompatible with domestic politics.

The emerging-market variants add a balance-sheet trap. Mexico in 1994 and the Asian economies in 1997 had banks and corporates borrowing in dollars against local-currency income, so devaluation — the textbook release valve — instantly bankrupted the private sector it was meant to relieve. The peg’s collapse and a banking crisis arrived as a single event, which is why these episodes were so much deeper than the ERM’s.

Pegs fail in the same direction they were built: slowly defended, suddenly abandoned. The atlas reads them as a subspecies of the general rule that fixed promises concentrate risk at a single breaking point rather than distributing it along a moving price.