Black Swan Observatory

Great Depression Banking Panics

Major · 1930–1933 · United States · № 025

Four successive waves of bank runs destroyed roughly a third of U.S. banks. Combined with deflation, output fell ~30%.

Primary trigger

Failure of Caldwell & Co. (1930) and subsequent regional bank runs.

Transmission channel

Bank failures → money supply collapse → debt deflation → output collapse.

Policy response

Late 1933: bank holiday, FDIC, gold revaluation, exit from gold standard.

Outcome

Defining 20th-century financial catastrophe; basis for modern deposit insurance.

Related concepts

Active Desk IC Hypotheses Citing This Analogue (1)

Internal investment committee memos citing this crisis as an empirical comparison or base-rate anchor:

Sources

  • 01bookMilton Friedman & Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (Princeton University Press, 1963).
  • 02paperBen S. Bernanke, "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression," American Economic Review 73, no. 3 (1983): 257–276.
  • 03bookElmus Wicker, The Banking Panics of the Great Depression (Cambridge University Press, 1996).

File card

RegionUnited States
Monetary regimeGold (then exit)
Catalogue weight10 / 10
Data qualityquantitative
Record as ofHistorical

Archetypes

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